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Abstract
This paper presents a case study chronicling the development of WebAIRS, an Australasian national anaesthetic
incident reporting database for health care practitioners. WebAIRS is an example of the multidisciplinary nature
of the IS discipline, incorporating IS theories, tools and principles in the creation of an IT artefact with
significant real world application. This case study introduces the background of the project and the motivations
for its conception including the need for critical incident reporting in anaesthesia, the process of its development
using IT students and the problems identified following its national release among the anaesthetic community.
The paper demonstrates the evolution of contemporary IS research and the IT artefact, and how each can be
crucial foundations for hospitals of the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Avison and Elliot (2006) consider the contemporary Information Systems (IS) discipline as focusing on
integrated aspects of technology and its management within organizational and social environments. They cite a
definition by the UK Academy for Information Systems, which considers the study of IS to be “a
multidisciplinary subject [that] addresses the range of strategic, managerial and operational activities involved in
the gathering, processing, storing, distributing and use of information, and its associated technologies, in society
and organizations.”
At the centre of IS study is the information technology (IT) artefact, a term used interchangeably with
technologies and systems. Leading scholars such as Weber (1987; 2006), Wand and Weber (2001) and
Orlikowski and Iacono (2006) have identified the centrality of the Information Technology (IT) artefact in the IS
discipline. The multidisciplinary nature of IS research and the broadening distribution of IT artefacts lends itself
to a wide variety of areas of study. A field where IS research is expanding is in the medical community, where
artefacts are used to assist health practitioners prevent errors and save lives.
This paper illustrates the multidisciplinarity of the Information Systems (IS) discipline by examining the
conception, emergence and appropriation of an anaesthetic incident reporting system: WebAIRS (Web-based
1
Anaesthetic Incident Reporting System). WebAIRS provides an illustrative case study suitable for introductory
IS courses to help explain the role of IS in society and the importance of mastering multiple concepts, which are
often required to establish new ways of working within a professional community. Its development is a example
of the multidisciplinary nature of IS integrating tenets of IS education, knowledge management, information and
system security, complex adaptive systems, IS appropriation, process management (of critical incidents) and
ethics in the creation, use, direction and impact of this system. The length limitations of this paper, however,
allow only a brief discussion of the application of these research streams to the story of WebAIRS.
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WebAIRS demonstrates the key role that IS will play in the hospitals of the future. It is presented as a
descriptive case study, drawing from the research and development activities of the participating authors who
include practising anaesthetists and information researchers. We will firstly set the scene by describing the role
of IT artefacts in the context of anaesthesia. Following a brief discussion of the appropriation of IT artefacts in
anaesthesia, the paper explains the knowledge management context and the role of critical incident reporting in
this medical field. A brief description of the development of WebAIRS is followed by discussions of the
system’s ethical considerations, information and system security and complex adaptive nature. A short example
of the system’s contribution to practice is given prior to some concluding comments.

ANAESTHETIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARE KEY IT ARTEFACTS
The term anaesthesia was first used by Greek philosopher Dioscorides in the first century AD, but the modern
usage of the term is credited to Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1846 (Morgan and Mikhail 2006). From the mid
1800’s to early 21st century the responsibilities of the anaesthetist have grown from the administration of
anaesthetic gases and vapours to the peri-operative care of patients undergoing anaesthesia for medical
procedures. The practice of anaesthesia consists of five main phases: 1) Pre-operative assessment and
optimisation of medical conditions; 2) Induction: when the anaesthetic is commenced by administration of drugs;
3) Maintenance and Monitoring: when the anaesthetist maintains a appropriate state of anaesthesia and bodily
function during the procedure; 4) Emergence: during which patient recovers from the effects of the anaesthesia;
and, 5) Post-operative: the period where the patient recovers from the effects of the procedure and requires
ongoing analgesia and physiological management. Each phase involves great complexity and the interaction of
multiple rules. A patient’s response depends on the other medications they may be taking, any background
medical conditions and the effects of the procedure. It is, therefore, impossible to predict using algorithms the
exact response each individual will have when anaesthetised. At each stage human factors such as opinion,
beliefs, intuition and errors may also affect the outcome.
Assisting anaesthetists in this task are sophisticated monitoring systems that provide early warning of changing
conditions within the patient (Calverley 1989). Improved patient outcomes have resulted from monitoring tools
such as the electrocardiograph (ECG), pulse oximetry, non-invasive automated blood pressure measurement, end
tidal carbon dioxide measurement and ventilator disconnect monitoring devices. These are incorporated into
anaesthetic workstations, which in turn shape the roles and expected capabilities of the anaesthetist (Byrick and
Cohen 1995; Greenwood 2005). Advanced monitoring technology is now arguably used in anaesthesia and
intensive care more than any other area of medicine (Smith et al 2003).
With the advent of the web, anaesthetic information systems have extended to online journals, various
professional resources such as crisis management manuals, continuing education and training systems, and now
a bi-national web based incident reporting system. The use of IT artefacts in medicine as a whole is increasing
rapidly. WebAIRS in particular has only become possible with the advent of the internet and the inter-industry
collaboration that is often necessary in the development of technologies incorporating disparate fields of study.
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anaesthesia was a core process and a central concern of the community. Figure 1 is the resultant model of this
study.
In the above model, Delaney et al – following a grounded theory study – determined that a basic social process
in anaesthesia is the appropriation of anaesthetic artefacts. This process has been central to the development of
the specialty, with examples that include the appropriation of artefacts from the beer and mining industries
(Thompson and Wilkinson 1985) in earlier times to the contemporary appropriation of information systems such
as WebAIRS. Figure 1 illustrates that supporting the central concern of appropriation are three drivers: namely,
why, what and how anaesthetists appropriate artefacts.
The driver for why anaesthetists appropriate is a result of the complexity of their work. To mitigate uncertainty
and channel evidence-based decision-making, anaesthetists appropriate artefacts that will assist with their
intensively knowledge-directed medicine. Secondly, what they appropriate are artefacts that are complementary
to their mental and practitioner models, such as systems and machines that aid in incident mitigation. Thirdly,
anaesthetists are able to justify how they appropriate such artefacts through a culture of anaesthesia that is driven
by mechanisms of group sharing and mutual benefit rather than individual-level drivers. These drivers
demonstrate the initiative of appropriation in anaesthesia and offer explanative reasons for the appropriation of
an artefact such as WebAIRS into their knowledge-based practice.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT
Anaesthetic communities of practice (CoP) in the region include the Australian and New Zealand College of
Anaesthetists (ANZCA), The Australian Society of Anaesthetists (ASA) and the New Zealand Society of
Anaesthetists (NZSA). These organisations oversee the entry, qualifying and continuing professional
development (CPD), quality control mechanisms, and research, thereby providing a CoP for practitioners to
generate and exchange knowledge. This anaesthetic network is a prime example of Wenger’s (1998) three
dimensions for a CoP, featuring joint enterprise, mutual engagement and shared repertoire of knowledge.
As part of a review of ANZCA activities in 2004, ANZCA Council formed several taskforces to research a
number of issues and suggest solutions to a variety of problems facing anaesthetists in the new millennium. One
of these taskforces was the Data Taskforce and Human Factors Research and another was the Quality and Safety
taskforce. This led to the formation of the Australian and New Zealand Tripartite Committee (ANZTADC) in
2006 which is funded and supported by ANZCA, the ASA and the NZSA. ANZTADC’s mission statement is
“To improve the safety and quality for patients in Australia and New Zealand by providing an enduring
capability to capture, analyse and disseminate information about incidents (de-identified) relative to the safety
and quality of anaesthesia in Australia and New Zealand” (ANZTADC 2011).
The aims of this organisation include developing a knowledge base of incidents which include methods to
prevent these incidents from occurring and methods for managing incidents that do occur in order to mitigate
their consequences. Although the concept has been used in anaesthesia since the 1980’s, the current systems in
anaesthesia are hospital- or state-based and there is no organised central repository of incident data and
knowledge for the whole of Australia and New Zealand. ANZTADC determined that establishing a repository
was the highest priority, as many of the incidents were recurrent. Although there were strategies that could be
used to prevent the incidents from recurring, the information was contained within local silos and was not being
propagated effectively beyond local hospital or state-based systems. So that the information for Australia and
New Zealand did not become retained in a bi-national silo, it was decided to communicate with similar
international systems such as the Anesthesia Quality Institute in the USA. This will enable information relating
to anaesthetic incidents to be propagated and received at an international level at some stage in the future.
WebAIRS provides a web-based program enabling users to log in and report the details of an incident. The
project does not replace or interfere with existing hospital incident recording and management systems but
enables the forwarding of a de-identified subset of the data to a bi-national registry. The bi-national registry will
be used to work out strategies at a bi-national level for preventing such incidents in the future. The information is
then passed back down the chain to all participating hospitals and also separately to members and fellows of
ANZCA, the ASA and NZSA in their official publications and annual scientific meetings.

DEVELOPMENT OF WEBAIRS
In 2007, ANZTADC commenced a review of existing incident reporting systems in Australia and New Zealand.
The committee identified the dataset to be collected, the ethical issues associated with the data collection, the
design issues of the database, compatibility issues with various web browsers, the outputs desired to produce the
knowledge base as well as data security and disaster recovery plans. After comprehensive discussion, a Strategic
Plan was developed in early 2008 and then using this plan, the system was designed. The next phase involved
evaluating existing systems against the requirements of the system design. It was found by late 2008 that none of
the currently available systems met the ANZTADC’s specifications for incident reporting. The system was built
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in 2009 by ANZTADC and QUT to the exact specifications of the original plan and named WebAIRS (Web
based Anaesthetic Incident Reporting System).
Incident reporting has been used in medicine since the 1950's in areas such as maternal mortality, surgical and
anaesthetic mortality. The reporting of unexpected outcomes and incidents in anaesthesia gained prominence
toward the late seventies, coinciding with the widening appropriation of computer-based systems and ICTs into
the clinical setting (Boelle et al 2000). An incident is defined as “any observable human activity that is
sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the
act” (Flanagan 1954, p. 1). Heinrich (1959) noted that incidents are precursors to accidents, therefore, the need to
gather information on incidents is important for constructing pre-emptive measures to mitigate the occurrence or
ramifications of critical events, preferably before harm occurs. A critical incident report is a vital component of
many high-risk industries, such as military and civil aviation, and the nuclear power industry (Webster 2005).
Cooper et al (1978) began appropriating the critical incident technique into anaesthesia in an attempt to uncover
patterns that lead to recurring accidents. In this study, they reported that the major cause of problems in
anaesthesia is human error - that is, error on the part of anaesthetists. Although anaesthetists are trained to react
swiftly in their diagnosis of sudden anomalies, there still exists a need to determine the root-causes of incidents
and how this knowledge can improve the management of future patients to avoid recurrences of the incidents.
An early Australian application of the critical incident reporting principle was in Townsville in 1985 by Dr. John
Williamson. This was followed in 1987 by Professor Bill Runciman, who established the Australian Patient
Safety Foundation. The Foundation coordinated the first national Anaesthesia Incident Monitoring System
(AIMS) (Webb et al 1993). AIMS began as a paper-based system but evolved into a system capable of
collecting, classifying, analysing, managing and learning about errors. The intention was for all incidents to be
reported, not simply those thought to be preventable or involve human error. This work resulted in the adoption
of a number of new technologies and recommendations that are believed to have reduced the likelihood of
several anaesthetic mishaps.
WebAIRS is the latest artefact to emerge from the co-evolution of anaesthetic practice and contemporary
technologies. It supports a critical incident process lifecycle that can be conceived as a complex adaptive system.
Incident Reporting as a Complex Adaptive System
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) systems were first studied in biological systems that involve individual
agents in an organisation (Holland 1995). Individual agents in these systems adapt competitively to external
forces, which in turn results in the whole system adapting. Complex adaptive systems have since been related to
human organisations and businesses. Traditionally, business systems have been codified as rigid sets of rules in
manuals. In some cases, however, the tasks were too complex to map. When this was the case it had to be left up
to humans to make decisions on the basis of their knowledge and experience. It can be argued that the
incorporation of incident reporting into anaesthetic practice is an example of a developing CAS.
As noted by Neale et al (2000), the complexity of anaesthesia means that an incident is not often standalone and
is often the culmination of multiple errors. Different variables and various diagnostic possibilities can elicit
confusion and great stress. An example of this situation is provided by the following vignette.
A patient begins a drop in blood pressure accompanied by a rising pulse rate. The anaesthetist detects this from
the monitors and starts to scan for a possible cause. However, there is no apparent cause, so the anaesthetist
increases the fluid infusion in case the cause is fluid or blood loss. After a few minutes, with blood pressure still
falling and the anaesthetist still uncertain of the cause, he calls for a second anaesthetist. The second anaesthetist
notices that the patient is developing a rash and suggests anaphylaxis (severe allergic reaction). The first
anaesthetist is surprised as it is 10-15 minutes since any new drugs have been given, but the second anaesthetist
indicates that it may have been caused by surgical skin preparation which is slow in onset. A treatment for
anaphylaxis is given, to good effect. In this example the first anaesthetist was so fixated on fluid loss, blood loss
or cardiac as possible causes that the rash which in turn indicated an allergic reaction was not noticed.
The complexity of this particular scenario, whereby an anaesthetist fixates on a particular line of diagnosis or
prognosis, is known as fixation error. A related phenomenon is called confirmation bias (Reason 1990;
Runciman et al 2007); once a particular diagnosis has been made, there is a strong tendency to interpret new
information as confirmatory, rather than to appreciate that it may be pointing in quite a different direction.
During the course of managing an incident, it is normal practice for an anaesthetist to call for assistance from a
colleague. The colleague will enter the OR, review the situation, consult with the principal anaesthetist and
suggest alternative diagnosis and management strategy from their own observations and experience. If necessary
the colleague will also begin thinking about possible resolutions, perhaps using the web-enabled personal
computer that is a feature of the modern OR. One advantage of using this consultative process is its potential to
overcome the occurrence of a fixation error. A second is to broaden the base of expertise and experience
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available to resolve the problem. A third is reducing the cognitive and technical load on the single anaesthetist.
The role of a second doctor broadens the scope of possible interventions and assists with managing the problem.
Underlying this process is the strong human tendency to operate by pattern recognition. Particularly when under
pressure of time, humans are less good at working things out from first principles than at recognising patterns
within events and situations, and fitting pre-formulated solutions to these patterns. This is why incident reporting
is particularly valuable. It disseminates information and allows analysis of complex situations with the advantage
of hindsight and the absence of time pressure. In effect, as Webster (2005) explained, incident reporting
increases the known system states and thereby increases the likelihood of practitioners averting disaster when
similar events occur in the future.
WebAIRS aids Anaesthetists, as a body, to react to the environment in the fashion of a CAS. Each time a new
incident occurs, it is put into the system and analysed so that the group as a whole can learn from individual
experiences. With this model, if the occurrence of a particular event results in an incident, the system should
then react to allow this event to be handled more effectively in the future.

Figure 2: A model of Complex Adaptive Systems
Audit systems in anaesthesia have previously been shown to be capable of improving safety and quality of care
(Grant et al 2008). Anaesthetic incident reporting is important to detect incidents which are then analysed and
solutions developed. These are then fed back to the anaesthetic community with the intent of improving clinical
practice. The result of this change in practice is continually monitored using the system allowing any problems
to this new solution to be reported and then further improved. This has a short feedback loop and thus has some
of the characteristics of a complex adaptive system, although it is not completely self-organising (as it requires
analysis and solution development as interventions) (ANZCA ASM 2008).
Data and System Security
System security issues were addressed prior to developing the system. Security provisions include secure login
through an encrypted connection and a dedicated server in a secure location. The database is duplicated using
two separate database programs and the server is backed up regularly. In addition, sensitive fields within the
database are also encrypted. One issue that was considered low risk was damage to the building; however when
the building was flooded during a so called “once in 30 year event” in Brisbane, in January 2011, the server was
moved to high ground ahead of the flood and the program rapidly relocated to another server. This was a good
test of how rapidly the system could be redeployed in an emergency. There are plans in motion to have servers
running permanently in both Brisbane and Melbourne with constant replication. If any similar events bring down
either server in the future then all traffic will be directed to the remaining server. This should reduce or eliminate
any downtime in future and provide greater security against possible loss of data.
Using Students to Develop the Artefact
2

The principal developer , anaesthetist Adjunct Professor Martin Culwick, completed a part-time Masters of
Information Technology during the period 2005-2007 studying both technical programming and information
systems courses such as knowledge management, information management and technology management. As part
of the information systems curriculum at QUT, final year students are required to engage in an industry project,
employing the skills that they have acquired during their course. On completion, the principal developer
mentored both undergraduate and postgraduate students, employing them on the WebAIRS project. Students
extended their skills through working on challenging problems within this mission-critical system, closely
monitored by the principal. Each student was given a specific piece of separate functionality to complete in
accordance with their ability and work rate. Given the nature of the system, students were required to have
specialised in software development and achieved high grades in their programming subjects.
This experience enabled these students to engage in a real-world complex system development and add this
experience to their curriculum vitae. To ensure the future ownership of the intellectual property, the ANZTADC
required each student to complete a legal release prior to working on the system. The combination of paid
2
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contractors, student efforts and the underlying design provided by the principal developer, based on his long
experience in anaesthetic practice resulted in an operational system that is now implemented across 29 hospitals
in Australia and New Zealand. Importantly, the drive for the appropriation and development of this system
emerged from the community of anaesthetists and not hospital administration, chief information officers or
policy officers, in accordance with the grounded theory model by Delaney et al (2008) shown in Figure 1.
Implementation and Future Directions
Because this system was designed to fulfil a need identified by the original ANZCA Quality and Safety
Taskforce in 2005 and it is supported by ANZCA, the ASA and NZSA, which are the three major professional
anaesthetic organisations in Australia and New Zealand, it greatly assisted the initial uptake by willing
participants. In Continuing Professional Development in Anaesthesia (CPD), each anaesthetist must complete
Quality Assurance activities each year. The system provides a means to complete these activities and is available
online which makes this system attractive and encourage “buy in”. Feedback from participants indicates a need
for integration electronically into the hospital system and this function is being currently developed with selected
hospitals. This will mean that in the future the anaesthetist will be able to enter the information into both systems
simultaneously. One subset is stored at the hospital and a non-identifiable subset forwarded bi-nationally.

RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS – SOME BASIC CONCEPTS
In Figure 3, there are nine major incident categories that have so far been accumulated in WebAIRS. The
reporting period is from near the end of 2009 to the 21st of July, 2011.

Figure 3: Incidents in the database by category
The most commonly reported events for this period were in the categories of Respiratory/Airway (21.46%),
Medication (18.05%), Medical Device/Equipment (17.54%) and Cardiovascular (14.99%). Many incidents in
anaesthesia (as in essentially all complex human endeavours) can be attributed to human error. The things that
predispose to these errors are often considered under the term ‘human factors’. Reason (1990) described a
General Error Model, and introduced the concept of latent factors in the system which increases risk. Disaster
seldom follows a single failure, whether active or latent, but rather requires the juxtaposition of several in quick
succession. This has lead to the well known analogy of Swiss cheese, in which the holes in the slices of cheese
are thought to represent latent factors, and the accident trajectory is understood to have to traverse all the slices
to actually cause harm. To achieve the objective of WebAIRS of preventing the recurrence of incidents, or more
specifically to prevent harm from such recurrences, the first step is the timely notification to the members of the
danger. After this has been done, an analysis can be undertaken of the system factors and other causes of the
event, and of possible ways of dealing with these through actions leading to a change to the established system.

AN EXAMPLE OF AN INCIDENT REPORTED TO WEBAIRS – AND OF A MULTIPRONGED RESPONSE
WebAIRS enables users to report the details of an incident. Figure 4 shows the data entry screen; the example
being entered concerns an incident arising during the infusion of insulin. The data entry pages are navigated
using the yellow tabs seen about a quarter of the way down the screen. The yellow tabs are awaiting completion,
the grey tab is currently being completed and the tabs turn green once that section is completed. The mainstay of
the initial data entry seen below is a narrative section, followed by the user providing a self analysis of what
happened and self-coding of the classification of the incident, then the details of the anaesthetic, the procedure,
contribution factors and finally a quality assurance section. This report is checked by a data analyst to remove
any identifying data such as a patient or hospital name and to ensure that the coding matches the narrative. An
analysis committee consisting of peers then scrutinises the incident to check the initial coding and look for root
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causes of the problem. The results are then used to construct reports and are recommendations for management
included in the web-based management tool.

Figure 4: Critical incident report entered into WebAIRS
The text from the screen shot is reproduced below:
During an emergency orthopaedic case in an insulin dependent diabetic, the insulin infusion from the ward was running out. A new
infusion was prepared by the anaesthetic registrar. I was the anaesthetic specialist supervising the registrar. When I checked the insulin
ampoule it was empty. The intended dilution was 2 units per ml and the syringe used was 50 mls, so it was expected that 9 mls would
remain in the insulin ampoule as the insulin was 100 units per ml in 10mls. When the registrar was challenged he replied that this was
the first time he had made up an insulin infusion and he thought there was 100 units per ampoule so he drew up all 10 mls and added it
to the syringe. When he checked the ampoule after this challenge he noted that it did say 100 units/ml 10mls but added that this is
really misleading as all other ampoules have the dose per ampoule, not dose per ml. I said this was the exception to the rule but thought
I ought to report it as it may be misleading to other junior staff who might not have made up this infusion previously.

This incident was classified as attributable to both a human factor and a systems factor. It was, in fact, one of
several incident reports associated with the administration of insulin. It was evident that the label was misread.
Although this is a human error, there was a latent factor in the system which probably predisposed to this error.
Many (if not most) drugs used in anaesthesia are labelled with the dose shown as the total amount of the drug in
the ampoule. For example, midazolam ampoules are labelled as “5mg in 5ml”, which is readily understood as
implying 1 mg per ml. Figure 5 shows an image of the insulin ampoule and the box in which it is supplied on the
left, and on the right is the hospital-assigned infusion kit.

Figure 5: Insulin kit on the left and anaesthetist's infusion kit on the right
The insulin label in the image on the left shows the dose as 100IU/ml 10ml (IU is the abbreviation for
International Units). Even an experienced practitioner accustomed to seeing the dose as the total amount per
ampoule might easily misread this as 100IU per 10mls which would be 10IU/ml. An additional point is that
many anaesthetists only occasionally need to make up insulin solutions and a new trainee may never previously
have made up this infusion at all. Focussing on the human error might well reduce the chance of the particular
trainee making the same mistake again, and it is certainly worth making sure that the lesson has been taken on
board. However, failing to address the system factors would set the stage for the same thing to happen in the
future to another practitioner, particularly an inexperienced one.
Having identified a risk, there are three possible responses: accept the risk, manage (or mitigate) the risk, or
eliminate the risk. Actions to address a risk may be strong (e.g., introducing a change in design, or a forcing
function), intermediate (e.g., introducing a process tool such as a checklist), or weak (e.g., providing a warning
sign or notification). Whatever is done must be not only possible but practical and affordable. Typically, as in
this case, more than one action may be appropriate. The first step in this event was to notify WebAIRS

22nd Australasian Conference on Information Systems
WebAIRS: How IS Saves Lives
29th November to 2nd December 2011, Sydney
Timbrell, Culwick, Delaney, Culwick, Goulding & Merry
anaesthetists by sending them an alert. This is demonstrably a weak action (people often fail to read alerts, or to
remember them if they do read them), but it is nevertheless important and has some value.
Addressing the problem with the label would have the potential to be more effective. However, it is unlikely that
persuading the manufacturer to change the label will be possible in a reasonable time frame. Writing to the
manufacturer about the incident and asking for consideration to be given to solutions including a change in
labelling is, important, but in the meantime something local is needed. In this case, at the hospital concerned, a
kit is provided by the hospital pharmacy (the image on the right in Figure 5). This involves providing insulin in a
prefilled syringe containing 3mls rather than 10 (limiting the potential for overdose) and carrying large, clear
labels. The format of the label is 300 units per 3 mls and so is in the format normally used by anaesthetists.
This kit has the additional advantage that it contains all the items required to make up the infusion. Normally
these items would have to be collected from various drawers in the anaesthetic trolley or the anaesthetic store
room, which is time consuming and probably increases the opportunities for error. Simplification of process is
generally considered to be a strong action to improve safety. The kit shown in Figure 5 was a pilot kit with hand
written labels but the final version will have pre-printed custom labels.
This is not a complete solution because it is, at present, confined to the hospital concerned. Further work is
needed to devise a solution that will apply more generally across Australia and New Zealand. The College
Document, PS51 (ANZCA PS51 2009) represents an attempt to promote better practice in relation to drug
administration in general, but more active promulgation of it is needed, and that too is planned as part of the
response to this incident. Advocacy with the manufacturer, as stated above, may in time solve the labelling
problem altogether. The communication on this should ideally come from the Presidents of all three parent
organisations of ANZTADC, and should be followed up with an emphasis on engagement, discussion and
ultimate resolution of the problem rather than necessarily predetermining what the ideal resolution should be
from the point of view of the manufacturer.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this WebAIRS case study, we have illustrated how the adoption of incident reporting by anaesthetists can lead
to a CAS. We have also outlined the multidisciplinary nature of information systems and the different skills and
knowledge needed to develop, secure, introduce and optimise an IT artefact within a professional community.
We have shown how the skilled IS practitioner needs to understand and manipulate multifaceted issues and
contexts including knowledge management, information and system security, complex adaptive systems, IS
appropriation, process management (of critical incidents) and ethics in the creation, use, direction and impact of
this system. The vignette regarding insulin dilution demonstrates the potential for IT artefacts such as WebAIRS
to save lives by alerting its target community to critical issues leading to the adoption of new processes. Finally,
it shows that solutions to problems that occur in anaesthesia are not simple, and that a multi-pronged approach is
often needed to genuinely improve safety throughout a region. As with any CAS, the expectation is that the
process will be self-improving and that over time the gains in safety for patients undergoing anaesthesia will be
substantial. The case also introduces some anaesthetic concepts such as fixation error, human and system
factors and critical incident reporting, which may be employed by the IS community to improve user outcomes.
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